Rivera for Final Two Outs Was Right Call

PHILADELPHIA -- Joe Girardi might not know the intricacies of the save rule, but he knew what he had to do.

Girardi's decision to use closer Mariano Rivera for the final two outs of the Yankees' defeat of the Phillies in Game 3 of the World Series created some debate.

Statistically-oriented obervers would cite "win expectancy" -- saying that it was a waste to use Rivera because the chance of winning was so great with one out, an 8-5 lead and no one on in the ninth.

But that ignores the magnitude of the situation.

The Yankees' lead was down to three runs. No matter how secure that seems with two outs to go, this is the World Series. Why risk it? Any loss in a best-of-seven series is gigantic.

The best postseason managers understand the importance of urgency. Don't manage for tomorrow, because today is much too important.

Girardi decided to slam the door shut, and it was the right call.

With Rivera having thrown 39 pitchers over two innings in game 2, the Yankees were obviously hoping to get through Game 3 without him and have him available for two innings in Game 4.

So up four after 8 1/2 innings, Girardi brought in Phil Hughes.

Hughes got an out and then allowed a Carlos Ruiz homer, making the score 8-5.

And Girardi called for Rivera. Who needed five pitches to close out the game.

Later, Girardi explained he had decided he would go with Hughes until a save situation arose.

Here's the thing: it wasn't a save situation. To earn a save, a pitcher needs to work a full inning with a three-run lead or enter with the tying run on base, at the plate or on deck.

When I told Girardi that technically it wasn't a save situation when Rivera came in, Girardi said: "To me it is."